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State Regulatory Efforts in Protecting a Surrogate’s Bodily Autonomy 
Alexus Williams* 
 
I. Introduction 
The field of infertility and assisted reproductive technology (ART)1 has made incredible 
strides throughout the last forty years.  Starting with the first human born by in vitro fertilization 
(IVF) in 1978,2 researchers of fertility treatment have made relentless efforts in finding new ways 
to help couples conceive.3  Just recently, in December of 2017, the United States welcomed the 
first live birth of a baby to a woman who had a uterine transplant.4  Due to these major, innovative 
developments in ART, millions throughout the world have actualized their dreams of starting a 
family.5   
According to the Center for Disease Controls (CDC) 2015 Fertility Clinic Success Rates 
Report, there were 231,936 ART cycles6 performed, resulting in 72,913 live born infants in that 
year alone.7 Today, approximately 1.6% of all infants born in the United States every year are 
conceived using ART.8 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University of Law; B.A. Rutgers University. I would like to thank Professor St. 
Romain for her time, energy, and advice, which had a substantial part in creating this piece. 
1 ART is defined as “[a]ll treatments or procedures that include the handling of human eggs or embryos to help a 
woman become pregnant.”  CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED. & SOC’Y 
FOR ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., 2015 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY FERTILITY CLINIC SUCCESS RATES 
REPORT 531 (2017), ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Publications/art/ART-2015-Clinic-Report-Full.pdf.   
2 Shivaji, The Journey of R. G. Edwards: From a Single Cell to Louise Joy Brown, 100 CURRENT SCI. 488, 488 (2011).  
On July 25, 1978, Louise Joy Brown became the first human to have been born after conception by IVF.  Id. 
3 See Art Success Rates, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, www.cdc.gov.gov/art/artdata/index.html (last 
visited April 10, 2018).  
4 Madison Park, Baby Is First To Be Born In US After Uterus Transplant, Hospital Says, CNN (Dec. 4, 2017, 4:54 
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/04/health/uterus-transplant-us-baby-birth/index.html. 
5 Art Success Rates, supra note 3. 
6 “ART cycles include any process in which (1) an ART procedure is performed, (2) a woman has undergone ovarian 
stimulation or monitoring with the intent of having an ART procedure, or (3) frozen embryos have been thawed with 
the intent of transferring them to a woman.”  CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. 
MED. & SOC’Y FOR ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., supra note 1. 
7 Art Success Rates, supra note 3. 
8 Id. 
 Advancements in reproductive biotechnology have created complicated legal, ethical, and 
moral dilemmas.9  Among the myriad of fertility services, including hormonal therapy, artificial 
insemination, and gamete/zygote intrafallopian transfer, one of the controversial methods of 
reproduction has grown at an even greater rate than ART generally: the use of surrogate mothers.10  
This emerging area of reproductive technology has led to many surrogacy-related disputes. 
 Despite the growing prevalence and availability of commercial surrogacy arrangements,11 
the law of surrogate motherhood in the United States is currently in a state of confusion.12  In the 
United States, surrogacy is governed by a hodgepodge of contradictory state laws; some enforcing 
surrogacy contracts, some banning them entirely, and some allowing them under certain 
circumstances.13  Many states, however, do not have any laws regarding surrogacy contracts.14  
The patchwork of legislation pertaining to surrogacy in the United States reflects the various 
ethical and practical concerns associated with this reproductive practice. 
 When surrogacy first came into use, there were numerous challenges to its very legality.15  
But now, as the practice has become more common, the legal issues have become more complex.16  
Among the various problems pertaining to this form of ART, the surrogate’s decision-making 
                                                          
9 See infra Part II.  Discussion of this broad domain is well beyond the purview of this Comment, but it should be 
noted that the issues include topics such as the rights of fetuses, donors, and adoptive parents; the liability of 
physicians; and patentable organisms and other new developments in research. 
10 Magdalina Gugucheva, Surrogacy in America, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS 3 (2010), 
www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pagedocuments/kaevej0a1m.pdf; see BRETTE MCWHORTER SEMBER, THE 
COMPLETE ADOPTION & FERTILITY LEGAL GUIDE 197 (1st ed. 2004).  The number of gestational surrogate cycles 
increased from 2,251 in 2006 to 4,725 in 2015 (a 110% increase), while the number of ART cycles performed only 
increased from 138,198 in 2006 to 182,154 in 2015 (a 32% increase).  CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED. & SOC’Y FOR ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., 2015 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT 50, 53 (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/2015-report/ART-2015-National-
Summary-Report.pdf.   
11 See infra Part II Section B.  
12 Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-807 (2013), with LA. STAT. ANN. §14:286 (2016). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 See infra Part II Section A.  
16 See infra Part II; see also infra Part III. 
authority is perhaps the most perplexing.  In 2015, a forty-seven-year-old California woman named 
Melissa Cook executed a gestational surrogacy contract with the intended parent and genetic 
father, known in the court filings as C.M.17  The surrogacy agreement spanned seventy-five pages 
and included a selective reduction clause, in which one or more of the fetuses in a multiple 
pregnancy may be terminated.18  Because of Cook’s advanced age, three male embryos were 
implanted into her uterus to increase the chances that at least one would prove viable.19  In this 
case, they all survived.20  Fearing he would not be able to afford triplets, C.M. asked Cook to 
reduce the pregnancy by one fetus and to abide by their agreement’s selective reduction clause.21  
Cook, however, refused to reduce, “citing her anti-abortion beliefs.”22  The three babies were 
ultimately born and a hotly contested legal battle over parentage and the constitutionality of the 
California Parentage Act ensued between Cook and C.M.23  As Cook indicates, one of the 
problematic issues plaguing surrogacy contracts is the question of decision-making. In fact, it 
stresses the need for heightened clarity in limiting which autonomous rights a surrogate can waive 
in a surrogacy agreement. 
  This Comment will analyze how different states regulate surrogacy issues.  Specifically, 
it will examine how these issues are regulated in regards to protecting a surrogate’s bodily 
autonomy.  Part II of this comment will examine the history of surrogacy.  Next, Part III will 
                                                          
17 Cook v. Harding, 190 F. Supp. 3d 921, 928 (C.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 879 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2018).   
18 Id.  
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 928–29.  
22 Id.   
23 Cook, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 925.  The California Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court of California’s judgment 
enforcing the gestational surrogacy contract between Cook and C.M.  C.M. v. M.C., 7 Cal. App. 5th 1118, 1118 
(2017).  The judgment cut off Cook’s parental rights to the three children in accordance with Cal. Fam. Code  § 7962.  
Id.  The following day, Cook filed a complaint against C.M. in the California Central District Court.  Cook, 190 F. 
Supp. 3d.  The Court held that the state judicial system provided an adequate outlet to seek relief, and therefore 
dismissed the claim.  Id. at 938.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the District Court’s order. Cook, 879 
F.3d at 1043. 
discuss issues that have come up involving disputes about critical decision-making roles between 
the surrogate and the intended parents.  Part IV will detail the current surrogacy regulatory schemes 
among the states.  Finally, Part V will provide solutions wherever gaps or variations exist and 
present a balancing test that can be implemented by the courts to determine the limitations of 
provisions that divest the surrogate of her autonomous, decision-making rights. This Comment 
will ultimately argue that legislation should impose ample restrictions on specific rights, such as 
the right to an abortion, that cannot be contracted away, as well as provide the courts with a 
sufficient legal framework.24  
II. The History of Surrogacy and its Evolution  
Surrogacy is a form of ART commonly utilized by couples desiring to start families of their 
own, but otherwise lacking the ability to do so.25  The rapid pace of advancements in reproductive 
technology has given infertile couples, same-sex couples, and single individuals ways to build a 
family through surrogacy. 26  Surrogacy is defined as “the process of carrying and delivering a 
child for another person.”27 The term commercial surrogacy is defined as “a contractual 
relationship where compensation is paid to a surrogate and agency . . . in exchange for the 
                                                          
24 Because the legislature cannot imagine every scenario in which the surrogate’s autonomous, decision-making rights 
could be compromised by a surrogacy agreement, the balancing test will provide the judiciary with guidance during 
disputes of first impression.   
25 What is Surrogacy?, CIRCLE SURROGACY, www.circlesurrogacy.com/pages/what-is-surrogacy (last visited Feb. 10, 
2018).  
26 See infra Part II B.  
27 Surrogacy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
surrogate’s gestational services.”28  Although the term is new,29 the idea of surrogacy has been 
practiced for years—even tracing back to Biblical times.30   
Commercial surrogacy implicates the bodily integrity of the surrogate and the rights of the 
intended parents to contract freely.31  This ultimately creates a tension between allowing the 
intended parents to make intrusive decisions for the surrogate mother, and ensuring the surrogacy 
contract does not divest the surrogate of all autonomous, decision-making rights.32  Before 
discussing the appropriate solution for this matter of contention, it is imperative to first explore the 
history and the evolution of surrogacy.  
A. The Two Different Types of Surrogacy Arrangements  
 There are two types of surrogacy arrangements: traditional surrogacy and gestational 
surrogacy.33  Traditional surrogacy was the first of the two procedures to be medically possible.34  
It is defined as a “pregnancy in which a woman provides her own egg, which is fertilized by 
                                                          
28 Katherine Drabiak et al., Ethics, Law, and Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for Uniformity, 35 J.L. MED & ETHICS 
300, 301 (2007). 
29 Modern surrogacy, as it is known today, has only been practiced for the last three decades.  About Surrogacy: From 
the Bible to Today: The History of Surrogacy, AM. SURROGACY, www.surrogate.com/about-surrogacy/surrogacy-
101/history-of-surrogacy (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).  It was not until 1980 that the first commercial surrogacy 
agreement was arranged between a traditional surrogate and the intended parents.  Id.  Soon after, in 1985, the first 
successful gestational surrogacy was completed.  Id.  These historic developments paved the way for the contemporary 
notion of surrogacy.  Id.  
30 In the Bible, when Sarah, Rachel, and Leah were infertile, they gave their handmaids—Hagar, Bilhah, and Zilpah—
to have babies for their husbands.  Genesis 16:1–4, 15; 30:1–10. 
31 See Katherine B. Lieber, Selling the Womb: Can the Feminist Critique of Surrogacy Be Answered?, 68 IND. L.J. 
205, 226–27 (1992).  
32 See Alayna Ohs, The Power of Pregnancy: Examining Constitutional Rights in a Gestational Surrogacy Contract, 
29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 340, 355–56 (2002).  
33 See Jennifer S. White, Gestational Surrogacy Contracts in Tennessee: Freedom of Contract Concerns & Feminist 
Principles in the Balance, 2 BELMONT L. REV. 269, 274 (2015); see also RICKIE SOLINGER, REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS: 
WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 108 (2013).  Surrogacy can take many forms, including: (1) a traditional surrogate 
mother who is both genetically related as well as carrying a child who has genetics from an intended father; (2) a 
traditional surrogate who uses donor sperm but is giving the child up to a different intended father and intended mother; 
(3) a gestational mother who has genetics from two donors but has two intended parents who will not be biologically 
related to the child; (4) a surrogate serving as a gestational mother who is impregnated with an intended parent’s sperm 
and an intended parent’s eggs; and (5) a gestational mother using genetics from one intended parent with help from a 
donor.  See Darra L. Hofman, “Mama’s Baby, Daddy’s Maybe:” A State-By-State Survey of Surrogacy Laws and 
Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 449, 451 (2009). 
34 See AM. SURROGACY, supra note 29.  
artificial insemination, and carries the fetus and gives birth to a child for another person.”35  
Because this earlier type of surrogacy uses the surrogate’s own egg, a biological relationship is 
created with the child, which makes a stronger case for courts to determine that the birth mother 
is also the legal mother.36  Such reasoning led to decisions such as the Baby M case, bringing 
widespread attention to the procedure and the possible legal complications that traditional 
surrogacy can entail.37 
 In 1986, surrogacy encountered its first significant legal challenge in possibly the most 
famous case in surrogacy history, the Baby M case,38 involving a traditional surrogacy 
arrangement.  The facts of the case riveted the attention of much of the country in the late 1980s 
and exemplified why traditional surrogacy arrangements have since been avoided.39  The case 
arose from a contract entered in February 1985 by William Stern and Mary Beth Whitehead.40  Mr. 
Stern and his wife, Elizabeth Stern, had hoped to have children and start a family of their own.41  
Mrs. Stern feared that this, however, was beyond the bounds of possibility due to her multiple 
sclerosis, which made pregnancy dangerous and even life threatening.42  At first the Sterns 
considered adoption but became discouraged at the delays involved.43  As an alternative, the couple 
decided to use surrogacy.44 
                                                          
35 Traditional Surrogacy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
36 See Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 110, 121 
(2009); see also In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396 (1988).  
37 In re Baby M, 109 N.J. at 396.  See also In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807 (Tenn. 2014); Doe v. Doe, 244 Conn. 403, 710 
A.2d 1297 (1998); A.L.S. ex rel. J.P. v. E.A.G., No. A10–443, 2010 WL 4181449 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2010).  
38 In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396 (1988).  
39 MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, MAKING BABIES, MAKING FAMILIES: WHAT MATTERS MOST IN AN AGE OF 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, SURROGACY, ADOPTION, AND SAME-SEX AND UNWED PARENTS 102 (2002).  
40 In re Baby M, 109 N.J. at 411. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 413. 
43 Id.  The Sterns declined to adopt for two additional reasons: (1) Mr. Stern desired his genetics to live on, particularly 
because most of his family had been lost in the Holocaust, and (2) the Sterns saw a potential problem arising from 
their age and their differing religious backgrounds.  Id. 
44 Id. 
 Mr. Stern and Whitehead subsequently entered into a surrogacy contract to which 
Whitehead agreed to be artificially inseminated using Mr. Stern’s sperm and to carry the child for 
the couple.45  The contract contained terms indicating that Whitehead would surrender the child 
and, in return, would receive a $10,000 fee.46  The insemination was successful; Whitehead became 
pregnant and gave birth to a baby girl in March 1986.47   
After turning the baby over to the Sterns, Whitehead began to experience emotional 
difficulty.48  The next day, she begged the Sterns to let her take the baby temporarily, promising 
to return with her later.49  Fearful that in her state of distress Whitehead might harm herself, the 
Sterns allowed her to take the child.50  The next week, however, Whitehead called the Sterns and 
informed them that she had changed her mind and could not relinquish the baby.51  The Sterns 
proceeded to sue Whitehead in New Jersey state court, seeking enforcement of the surrogacy 
contract.52  After an order was entered requiring her to relinquish custody, Whitehead fled to 
Florida with Baby M.53  It was not until the end of July, that Florida police invaded the home, 
forcibly removed the baby, and delivered the child back to the Sterns.54   
When the Sterns regained possession of the child, the prior order of the court requiring 
Whitehead to relinquish custody was reaffirmed by the trial court.55  The trial court held that the 
contract by which Whitehead had agreed to bear the child for the Sterns was valid, and that Mr. 
                                                          
45 Id. at 412. 
46 In re Baby M, 109 N.J. at 412.  
47 Id. at 414.  Whitehead called the baby Sara and the Sterns called the baby Melissa.  Id. at 414–15.  
48 Id.  
49 Id. at 415. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 In re Baby M, 109 N.J. at 415–16. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 416.  
55 Id.  
Stern was the legal parent.56  Whitehead appealed, and the New Jersey Supreme Court granted 
direct certification.57  The New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated the surrogacy contract on public 
policy grounds,58 and held the intended payment illegal59 and potentially degrading to women.60  
The court then used the legal standard of “the best interests of the child” for custody purposes, and 
determined that custody should be awarded to the Sterns.61  
In traditional surrogacy arrangements, like that entered into by Mary Beth Whitehead and 
William Stern, the surrogate, whose egg is fertilized, is the true biological mother of the child, 
which makes a stronger case that she also has parental rights to the child.62  In these scenarios, in 
order to officially establish the intended parents as the child’s legal parents, the surrogate’s parental 
rights need to be terminated, and the genetically unrelated intended parent needs to complete a 
stepparent adoption.63  Because of these additional legal complications, many surrogacy 
professionals stopped offering traditional surrogacy programs and, instead, moved towards the use 
of gestational surrogacy programs.64   
                                                          
56 Id. at 417.  A major part of the trial court’s decision was based upon the view that custody with the Sterns was in 
the child’s best interests.  Id. at 417–18.  The trial took more than two months, entailing six weeks of testimony and 
half a million dollars of legal bills.  Id. at 417; MARTH A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: THE LEGAL AND HUMAN 
ISSUES 4 (1990).  
57 In re Baby M, 109 N.J at 419.  
58 Id. at 434–39.  Specifically, the court found that surrogacy contracts were void because they violated policies 
concerning the consent of the surrogate to surrender the child.  Id.  According to the court’s reasoning, “the natural 
mother is irrevocably committed before she knows the strength of the bond with her child. She never makes a totally 
voluntary, informed decision.”  Id.at 437.  
59 Id. at 423–32.  
60 Id. at 439 (“On reflection . . . it appears that the essential evil is . . . taking advantage of a woman’s circumstances . 
. . in order to take away her child.”). 
61 Id. at 452–53, 461–62.  The Court remanded the case to the trial court for determination on visitation.  Id. at 463–
64.  On remand, the trial court found that it was in the child’s best interest to have an ongoing relationship with 
Whitehead and, therefore, granted her “unsupervised, uninterrupted, liberal visitation” with Baby M.  Matter of Baby 
M, 225 N.J. Super. 267, 269 (Super. Ct. 1988).  
62 Scott, supra note 36.  
63 Intended Parents: Establishing Parentage in Surrogacy, AM. SURROGACY, www.surrogate.com/intended-
parents/surrogacy-laws-and-legal-information/establishing-parentage-in-surrogacy (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).   
64 See Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER. 68, 79 
(2007) (indicating that ninety-five percent of surrogacies arrangements are gestational).  
Gestational surrogacy differs from traditional surrogacy in that it is a “pregnancy in which 
one woman (the genetic mother) provides the egg, which is fertilized, and another woman (the 
surrogate mother) carries the fetus and gives birth to the child.”65  Because the surrogate does not 
provide the egg, she is not biologically related to the child.66  Therefore, it is less burdensome for 
courts to determine that the surrogate has no parental rights to said child.67 This, in effect, 
simplifies parentage issues and makes gestational surrogacy less legally complicated than 
traditional surrogacy.68  Gestational surrogacy has proven to be more attractive to the parties and 
more palatable to lawmakers and the public.69  Over the last three decades,70 this type of surrogacy 
has experienced an expanding growth in popularity, which can be attributed to cases such as the 
Johnson v. Calvert case.71  
Five years after the Baby M decision, the enforceability of a commercial surrogacy contract 
was again litigated in Johnson v. Calvert.72  By contrast, however, the dispute focused on 
gestational surrogacy.73  In 1990, Anna Johnson contracted with Mark and Crispina Calvert, 
agreeing to be implanted with an embryo created from Mr. Calvert’s sperm and Mrs. Calvert’s egg 
and to gestate the fetus to term.74  The contract stipulated that the child was to be considered the 
                                                          
65 Gestational Surrogacy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
66 Gestational Carrier or Surrogacy, AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., www.reproductivefacts.org/topics/topics-
index/gestational-carrier-or-surrogacy (last visited Feb. 10, 2018). 
67 Brittnay M. McMahon, The Science Behind Surrogacy: Why New York Should Rethink Its Surrogacy Contracts 
Laws, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 359, 363 (2011).  
68 See Scott, supra note 36. 
69 See infra text accompanying notes 72–84.   
70 AM. SURROGACY, supra note 29. 
71 Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84 (1993).  
72 Id.  This case is considered the second most important surrogacy case in the United States.  See J. HERBIE DIFONZO 
& RUTH C. STERN, INTIMATE ASSOCIATIONS: THE LAW AND CULTURE OF AMERICAN FAMILIES 96 (2013).  Although 
its decision generated little controversy, the case had a profound impact on surrogacy practice.  Scott, supra note 36 
at 122.  Gestational surrogacy promptly became the preferred arrangement.  Id.  
73 Johnson, 5 Cal. 4th at 87.  
74 Id.  Mark and Crispina Calvert had desired to have children but were unable to because Crispina had undergone a 
hysterectomy, where her uterus was removed.  Id.  “Her ovaries remained capable of producing eggs, however, and 
the couple eventually considered surrogacy.”  Id.  
Calverts’ and that Johnson would relinquish all parental rights in exchange for three payments 
totaling $10,000.75  In the months succeeding Johnson’s in vitro fertilization, however, the 
relations between the parties became strained.76  Johnson demanded the full balance of her 
payments, threatening that she would refuse to relinquish the child unless the Calverts complied.77  
The Calverts responded with a lawsuit to determine the parentage of the child.78 
The Supreme Court of California resolved the dilemma by looking at the intent of the 
parties in signing the contract.79  The court determined that when both gestation and genetic ties 
“do no coincide in one woman, she who intended to procreate the child—that is, she who intended 
to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own—is the natural mother.”80  
The court found intent to be the primary determinant of parentage, reasoning that the child would 
not have been born but for the intention of the Calverts.81  The Supreme Court of California found 
the case to be distinguishable from the Baby M case because Anna Johnson, unlike Mary Beth 
Whitehead, had no genetic relationship to the child.82  The importance of the biological connection 
between the pregnant woman and the fetus to determine parentage was evident.83  The court 
                                                          
75 Id.  
76 Id. at 87–88.  The relationship between the parties deteriorated after “Mark learned that Anna had not disclosed she 
had [previously] suffered several stillbirths and miscarriages.”  Id. at 87.  Additionally, the Calverts had agreed to buy 
a $200,000 life insurance police on Anna’s life, but failed to do.  Id. at 87–88.   
77 Id. at 88.   
78 Id.  
79 Johnson, 5 Cal. 4th at 95.  
80 Id. at 93.  
81 Id. at 95.  A number of cases following Johnson have relied on the rule of intent to resolve surrogacy disputes.  Perri 
Koll, The Use of the Intent Doctrine to Expand the Right of Intended Homosexual Male Parents in Surrogacy Custody 
Disputes, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 199, 200 (2012).  For further discussion of the “intent doctrine” see id. 
(demonstrating why courts should follow the Johnson approach in solving surrogacy disputes by awarding custody to 
the intended parents).   
82 See Johnson, 5 Cal. 4th at 93, 104.   
83 Id. 
ultimately concluded that the Calverts were the genetic parents, that Johnson had no parental 
rights, and that the contract was legal and enforceable.84 
The difference between gestational and traditional surrogacy arrangements has become an 
important legal distinction.  In the case of traditional surrogacy, it is clear that the surrogate is the 
biological mother of the child and, as such, has a claim to parental rights to the child.85  In the case 
of gestational surrogacy, however, the surrogate is in no way biologically related to the child and 
therefore has no parental rights to said child.86  Hence, commercial surrogacy arrangements are 
typically limited to gestational surrogacy because it is less legally complicated—that is, it 
efficiently offers legal certainty about the parental status of all parties to the surrogacy 
arrangement—than traditional surrogacy.87   
B. Trends and Reproductive Outcomes that Have Led to the Growth of Surrogacy over the 
Years 
 The cost for gestational surrogacy arrangements can run from $60,000 to $150,000 when 
medical and legal expenses are included.88  Despite these high costs, however, the practice of 
gestational surrogacy is growing rapidly.89  Due to advancing medical knowledge and techniques, 
commercial surrogacy is now being used to serve the desires of couples struggling with infertility 
issues, single individuals, and same-sex couples to start a family of their own.90  Although there is 
                                                          
84 Id. at 88, 101.  See also J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740 (Ohio 2007); J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006); 
Nolan v. Labree, 52 A.3d 923 (Me. 2012).  
85 Scott, supra note 36. 
86 McMahon, supra note 67. 
87 For additional commentary on how the expansion of gestational surrogacy has been an important factor in changing 
the way people view surrogacy arrangements see Scott, supra note 36. 
88 See Intended Parents: How Much Does Surrogacy Cost?, AM. SURROGACY, www.surrogate.com/intended-
parents/the-surrogacy-process/how-much-does-surrogacy-cost (last visited Feb. 10, 2018); see also Understanding 
Costs, GROWING GENERATIONS, www. growinggenerations.com/surrogacy-program/intended-parents/surrogacy-cost 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2018).  
89 SOLINGER, supra note 33, at 108. 
90 See FIELD, supra note 56, at 37; see also SHANLEY, supra note 39, at 106.  
no formal collection of statistics that tracks surrogate births in the United States, estimates suggest 
that gestational surrogate births doubled from 2004 to 2008, reaching approximately 1,000 births 
annually.91  The CDC statistics indicate that between 1999 and 2013, gestational carrier cycles 
resulted in 13,380 deliveries and the births of 18,400 infants—half of which were twins, triplets, 
or higher order multiples.92  In 2011, the Society of Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART) 
tracked 1,593 babies born in the United States to gestational surrogates, up from 1,253 in 2009, 
and just 738 in 2004.93   
 The appeal to couples struggling with infertility issues has been an important factor in the 
growing prevalence of gestational surrogacy.94  Commercial surrogacy arrangements allow 
infertile individuals who cannot bear children to assume the responsibilities of parenthood.95  
According to the CDC, about 12.1% of women (6.7 million) in the United States aged fifteen to 
forty-five have difficulty getting pregnant or staying pregnant and about 9.4% (5.8 million) of men 
in the United States aged fifteen to forty-five have some form of infertility or nonsurgical 
sterility.96  Many infertile couples view gestational surrogacy as an alluring alternative to 
                                                          
91 GUGUCHEVA, supra note 10.  Currently, there are only two sources of statistics on gestational surrogacy.  Id. at 6.  
Both the CDC and SART collect and report data on the success rates per ART cycle carried out in fertility clinics 
nationally.  See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED. & SOC’Y FOR ASSISTED 
REPROD. TECH., 2015 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY FERTILITY CLINIC SUCCESS RATES REPORT (2017), 
ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Publications/art/ART-2015-Clinic-Report-Full.pdf.  Each clinic is required to report whether it offers 
services to patients using gestational surrogate and what percentage of IVF cycles were performed on surrogates.  Id.  
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it is likely that both data sets are under-inclusive.  
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findings/gestational-carriers.html (last visited April 10, 2018).  
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adoption.97  Individuals struggling with infertility issues prefer to use gestational surrogacy rather 
than adoption because of their desire to create children genetically related to their family.98   
 Another factor attributing to the growing prevalence of gestational surrogacy is an 
individual’s inability to conceive based on circumstantial limitations—for example, single 
individuals preferring to raise a child alone, or same-sex couples seeking parenthood.99  Persons 
in these situations are unable to give birth to a child without the assistance of reproductive 
technology.100  Therefore, with the emergence of gestational surrogacy, single individuals and 
same-sex couples can pursue parenthood in ways that, until now, were not possible.101  As a viable 
option for conception without engaging in intercourse, gestational surrogacy provides single 
individuals and couples in same-sex relationships the opportunity to develop their own nuclear 
family, while still retaining a genetic relationship with their children.102  
 Same-sex male couples, in contrast to same-sex female couples, however, have no other 
option than gestational surrogacy if they wish to have a biological connection to their child.103  
Although there is no formal tracking on the number of same-sex male couples having babies 
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through the means of gestational surrogacy, observers say that the numbers are growing.104  An 
unofficial study conducted by Fertility IQ on behalf of the Chicago Tribune suggests that more 
same-sex male couples in the United States are turning to surrogacy than in previous years.105  The 
study, involving data from fertility clinics in ten different cities, found that “10 to 20 percent of 
donor eggs are going to gay men having babies via [gestational] surrogacy, and in a lot of places 
the numbers are up to 50 percent from five years ago.”106  Gestational surrogacy is seen as an 
appealing option for same-sex male couples seeking to have children with some of their own 
genetic material rather than adopting.107 
 The decision to enter into a commercial surrogacy arrangement is not an easy decision for 
prospective parents; however, couples struggling with infertility issues, single individuals, and 
same-sex couples are willing to go through various medical procedures, sign a variety of legal 
documents, and pay significant sums of money simply to experience the joy of having biologically 
related children.108  As the availability of commercial surrogacy arrangements continues to grow, 
individuals are becoming increasingly more aware of its potential as a viable option to obtain 
parenthood.109  
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C. Feminist Legal Theory: Surrogacy Through the Lenses of Various Schools of Feminism  
 It was through the Baby M case that commercial surrogacy was first scrutinized as an issue 
of social, political, and legal interest.110  Not only did the case garner national attention, but it also 
produced a feminist split on the issue of surrogacy.111  At the time of the proceedings, a group of 
well-known feminists joined with the Foundation on Economic Trends to file an amicus curiae 
brief in the case.112  The brief argued that the commercialization of surrogate parenthood violated 
the dignity of women.113  In response to this critique, however, other feminists argued that 
commercial surrogacy ensured a women’s right to self-determination.114  Even the New Jersey 
Chapter of the National Organization for Women (NOW)115 failed to reach a consensus on the 
issue.116  The head of the chapter was reported to have said: “We do believe that women ought to 
control their own bodies, and we don’t want to play big brother or big sister and tell them what to 
do . . .  But on the other hand, we don’t want to see the day when women are turned into breeding 
machines.” 117   
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Pogrebin.  Id.; see Elizabeth Mehren, Feminists Fight Court Ruling in Baby M Decision: Steinem, Friedan, Chesler, 
French Among Supporters, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 1987, at 1; see also Joseph F. Sullivan, Brief by Feminists Opposes 
Surrogate Parenthood, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2987, at A1.   
113 Sullivan, supra note 112.  
114 See Iver Peterson, Baby M Trial Splits Ranks of Feminists, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1987, at B1.  
115 NOW is the largest organization of feminist activities in the United States. Who We Are, NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, 
www. now.org/about/who-we-are (last visited Feb. 10,2018).  Since its founding in 1966, NOW’s goal has been to 
take action to bring about equality for all women.  Id.  
116 MACKLIN, supra note 111. 
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After the Baby M case, the division in the varying feminist schools of thought on 
commercial surrogacy continued to be a topic of contention.118  Today, while some feminist 
scholars and commentators view commercial surrogacy in a positive light—as a technology that 
gives women the ability to make use of their reproductive capacity—other feminists argue that 
surrogacy is an exploitative tool that undermines bodily autonomy and integrity.119  One 
commonality among the varying feminist viewpoints on this issue, however, is that the intended 
parents should not have an unfettered right to control or limit the surrogate’s behavior during the 
pregnancy by provisions in a surrogacy contract.120  The majority of feminists are in agreement 
that the underlying purpose of the feminist movement is to allow women more control over their 
reproductive choices.121  It is important to explore the arguments in favor of commercial surrogacy 
as well as the arguments against commercial surrogacy in order to find an appropriate solution.  
 On one hand, feminist proponents of commercial surrogacy argue that it gives women more 
reproductive options, thus granting women control over the biological processes that have 
historically defined them.122  In their view, the key idea is freedom of choice.123  For example, 
Hugh V. McLachlan argues that prohibiting “mothers from making . . . particulate interpretations 
of their pregnancies” would violate their right to autonomy, ultimately reinforcing the negative 
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stereotype of women as incapable of full rational agency.124  And on the other hand, feminists that 
oppose commercial surrogacy view it as a form of slavery or prostitution in which the surrogate is 
exploited and controlled through her reproductive capacities.125  Many believe that it is a form of 
oppression that divests the surrogate of all autonomous, decision-making rights.126  Feminists 
arguing against commercial surrogacy focus on the concept of control and free choice.127  From 
this perspective, commercial surrogacy is “a process meant to control women and their procreative 
powers for the benefit of men.”128  Therefore, in formulating the appropriate solution, one should 
keep in mind that the middle ground between these two viewpoints is the encouragement of the 
surrogate’s freedom of choice—which is to say, the majority of feminists agree that the intended 
parents should not have an unfettered right to control or limit a surrogate’s behavior.  
III. The Composition of a Standard Surrogacy Contract  
 Commercial surrogacy arrangements are anomalous in that they involve one or more 
persons contracting for the provision of labor that implicates the bodily integrity of a third party.129  
Contractual provisions in the commercial surrogacy agreement regulate the surrogate’s conduct 
during pregnancy.130  Each contract will be slightly different, but generally speaking, a standard 
surrogacy agreement imposes obligations on the surrogate “to visit the doctor, to eat healthy, and 
to refrain from consuming substances such as drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes that could harm the 
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developing fetus.”131  Because the potential life engenders some degree of social concern, these 
provisions appear to have reasonable restrictions; however, issues arise when these provisions 
divest the surrogate of all autonomous, decision-making rights.132  For example, most commercial 
surrogacy contracts regulate when the surrogate can engage in sexual activity and with whom, and 
also contain abortion and selective fetal reduction clauses.133  Thus, it is important that the 
autonomous rights of the surrogate are “reaffirmed so as to prevent intended parents from believing 
that by virtue of carrying a fetus for them, a surrogate is surrendering all of her constitutional rights 
to make decisions about her own body.”134  Before discussing the appropriate limitations, however, 
it is necessary to first closely examine the public policy and constitutional concerns raised by these 
intrusive decision-making provisions in commercial surrogacy contracts.  
A. Abortion and Selection Fetal Reduction Clauses  
 In general, commercial surrogacy contracts typically contain stipulations that either compel 
or restrict a surrogate to have an abortion.135  The provision may read as follow: 
The Surrogate agrees that she will not abort the child once conceived except, if in 
the opinion of the inseminating physician, such action is necessary for the physical 
health of the Surrogate or the child has been determined by said physician to be 
physiologically abnormal. In the event of either of these two (2) contingencies, the 
surrogate desires and agrees to have said abortion.136 
Controversial cases surrounding the enforcement of these abortion clauses in commercial 
surrogacy agreements have garnered widespread attention in recent years.  In 2013, Crystal Kelley, 
a gestational surrogate for an infertile couple, refused to terminate a fetus with severe 
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abnormalities.137  Twenty-one weeks into the pregnancy, medical tests indicated that the fetus had 
a cleft palate, a heart abnormality, and Down syndrome.138  The intended parents mandated that 
the child be aborted immediately.139  Although the surrogacy contract contained a clause giving 
the intended parents the right to terminate the fetus at any time if it had severe and debilitative 
abnormalities, Kelley refused to have an abortion.140   
 Another case arose in 2016 after a surrogate, Melissa Cook, refused to selectively reduce 
a high-risk triplet pregnancy.141  Because of Cook’s advanced age, multiple embryos were 
transferred to increase the chances that at least one would prove viable.142  Fearing he would not 
be able to afford triplets, the intended father, known in the court filings as C.M., asked Cook to 
reduce the pregnancy by one fetus and abide by their agreement’s selective reduction clause.143  
Cook, however, refused to reduce, “citing her anti-abortion beliefs.”144   
 In 2001, Helen Beasley entered into a surrogacy agreement with Charles Wheeler and 
Martha Berman.145  The contract contained numerous clauses providing for nearly every possible 
contingency—including the requirement that Beasley would have to honor the couple’s decision 
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to have a selective reduction in the chance of a multiple pregnancy.146  After Beasley discovered 
that she was carrying twins, however, she refused to proceed with the selective reduction.147  A 
battled ensued, with Wheeler and Berman unwilling to parent the two fetuses Beasley carried.148  
Because Beasley failed to comply with the contract, she faced the possibility of becoming a 
“mother.”149  These cases reveal important constitutional concerns surrounding commercial 
surrogacy arrangements.150  In each situation, the intended parents attempted to abrogate the 
surrogate’s constitutional rights with the use of contractual provisions.151   
This area of contention surrounding the decision to reduce the pregnancy of a surrogate 
necessarily implicates Roe v. Wade.152  In Roe, the Supreme Court held that, prior to fetal viability, 
a woman has the constitutional right to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.153  Justice 
Blackmun, writing for the majority, stated that the “right of privacy, whether it be founded in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty . . . or . . . the Ninth Amendment’s reservation 
of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy.”154  The Court noted, however, that the State has a compelling interest 
in potential life, which must be balanced against the pregnant woman’s liberty rights.155   
The ruling in Roe appears to be applicable to the surrogacy situation as well.  Privacy is 
protected in all abortion cases, up until the first trimester, notwithstanding whether the woman is 
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a surrogate or not.  The surrogate, in carrying the child, is the person who undergoes several aspects 
of pregnancy recognized in Roe to support a woman’s constitutional right to abortion.156  This is 
not without acknowledging the fact that the State has a compelling interest in protecting the desires 
of the intended parents, which must be balance against the surrogate’s privacy rights.157   Roe’s 
constitutional principles provide a surrogate with the basis upon which she can claim sole right to 
decide whether or not to abort the developing fetus that she is carrying for another.158  
In the context of abortion rights, commercial surrogacy agreements are analogous to 
spousal consent requirements.  In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,159 the 
Supreme Court struck down a Missouri requirement of a husband’s written consent for an abortion 
during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy. 160  The Court held that a “State does not have the 
constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute . . . veto over” the abortion decision.161  In 
assessing the constitutional validity, the Court balanced “a man’s right to father children” and 
woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy, and concluded that since the woman “is more directly 
and immediately affected by the pregnancy . . . the balance weighs in here favor.”162  As such, if a 
husband’s consent is not required before a wife terminates her pregnancy, then the consent of the 
intended parents should not constitutionally be required either.  A women’s right to decide whether 
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to continue pregnancy or to have an abortion falls within the scope of bodily autonomy and privacy 
protections that Roe v. Wade made clear forty-five years ago.163   
The selective fetal reduction clauses within the surrogacy contracts cited in the cases above 
clearly exemplify the unconstitutional nature of commercial surrogacy arrangements when an 
intended parent attempts to make intrusive decisions for the surrogate mother.  Thus, the 
constitutional implications of these provisions should favor the surrogate and, in addition, Courts 
should not enforce a contractual provision requiring a surrogate to abort a fetus against her will, 
or prevent her from obtaining an abortion that she has decided is in her best interest.  
B. Other Areas of Intrusive Decision-Making  
 In addition to termination and selective fetal reduction clauses, commercial surrogacy 
agreements attempt to control and restrict other areas pertaining to the surrogate’s decision-making 
abilities.164  For example, surrogacy contracts can contain clauses that regulate the surrogate’s diet, 
exercise, living arrangements, activities, when the surrogate can engage in sexual activity and with 
whom, and even end-of-life decision making.165  Terms of the agreement providing that the 
surrogate must not smoke or drink alcoholic beverages, or that the surrogate mother abstain from 
sex for a short period after insemination are reasonable restrictions.166 Terms of the agreement, 
however, stipulating that the surrogate mother must consume a vegan diet and eat only organic 
foods, or that the intended parents will control all medical treatment decisions are not reasonable 
restrictions and also violate constitutional principles derived from Roe.167  Therefore, it is 
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necessary to find the extent to which these provisions can impinge the bodily integrity of the 
surrogate.  
 There is, in fact, broad agreement “that while fetal life deserves respect, its protection 
cannot take priority over the rights of the pregnant woman.”168  The protection of a surrogate’s 
bodily autonomy should include her right to make medical decisions, which not only encompasses 
abortion, but also “the freedom to care for one’s health and person” and the “freedom from bodily 
restraint or compulsion.”169  The right to control one’s medical treatment is highly personal.170  For 
example, in In re Doe, a pregnant woman was informed that if she failed to have an immediate 
cesarean section, that her child could be born dead or with severe mental defects.171  Because of 
religious beliefs, the woman, instead, elected to deliver naturally and refused to consent to the 
procedure.172  The court confirmed her right to make such a decision, stating, “Applied in the 
context of compelled medical treatment of pregnant women . . . a woman’s right to refuse invasive 
medical treatment, derived from her rights to privacy, bodily integrity, and religious liberty, is not 
diminished during pregnancy.”173  This ruling, again, appears to be applicable to the surrogacy 
situation.  There is no reason to distinguish between mothers who give birth naturally and 
surrogates who carry developing infants unrelated to them—both implicate personal rights related 
to autonomous decision-making. 
 Contractual provisions dictating the surrogate’s conduct throughout the pregnancy create 
a tension between allowing the intended parents to make decisions for the surrogate mother in the 
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hopes of protecting their developing fetus, and ensuring that the surrogacy contract does not divest 
the surrogate of all autonomous, decision-making rights.  By using the Roe v. Wade framework, 
as well as the In re Doe decision, there are well-established constitutional rights that protect the 
surrogate mother from unfettered bodily intrusion.174  It should of course be acknowledged that 
this robust commitment to respecting a surrogate’s right to make her own decisions extends only 
to what she has not waived in the surrogacy contract.  Therefore, courts should not enforce 
contracts that compel waiver of constitutional rights and states should legislatively impose 
restrictions on which aspects of decision-making can or cannot be waived.  
IV. The Current Regulatory Scheme Among the States 
  Despite the growing prevalence and availability of commercial surrogacy arrangements,175 
the law of surrogate motherhood in the United States is still in a state of confusion.176  Surrogacy 
laws are determined by each state, and states have widely differing laws; some enforcing surrogacy 
contracts, some banning them entirely, and some allowing them under certain circumstances.177  
Many states, however, do not have any laws regarding surrogacy contracts.178  As a result, courts 
are often left to decide contractual disputes when they arise, and have a range of approaches by 
which to do so.179   
An important starting position that states need to consider in determining their surrogacy 
laws is to focus on the surrogate.  This section will examine how different states with surrogacy 
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laws handle contracts that include intrusive decision-making provisions that affect the bodily 
integrity of the surrogate.  It is imperative to assess the various ways in which states address this 
matter of contention in order to find an appropriate solution to ensure that the surrogacy contract 
does not divest the surrogate of all autonomous, decision-making rights.  
 
 
A. State Statutes Limiting Intrusive Decision-Making Provisions in Surrogacy 
Arrangements 
 Some states have already adopted statutes that restrict the extent to which a surrogacy 
contract can restrict the decision-making rights of a surrogate.  Maine,180 Texas,181 and Utah182 
have enacted provisions that protect the surrogate’s autonomous rights in a broad sense.  They all 
state in a similar manner that the surrogacy agreement cannot limit the right of the gestational 
surrogate to make decisions to safeguard her health.183  The legislatures from these states, however, 
failed to define what decisions fall within the “to safeguard her health” scope.184  As a result, an 
argument can be made that it would include the right to choose whether or not to have an abortion 
or a cesarean section, but the bounds are unknown.  This ambiguity will eventually lead to disputes 
attempting to discern which provisions constitute a decision to safeguard a surrogate’s health.  
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 On the other end of the spectrum, are states, such as Indiana,185 Louisiana,186 and Florida,187 
which have enacted provisions that protect the surrogate’s autonomous, decision-making rights in 
a narrow sense.  For example, Indiana holds it against public policy to require a surrogate to do 
any of the following: “consent to undergo or undergo an abortion,” “use a substance or engage in 
activity only in accordance with the demands of another person,” or “waive parental rights or 
duties to a child.”188  Louisiana and Florida have similar provisions that prohibit a surrogacy 
agreement from containing termination or selective fetal reduction clauses.189  These states leave 
a significant degree of latitude for the intended parents to control other areas of intrusive decision-
making for the surrogate mother.  
 In addition to imposing restrictions on specific rights that cannot be contracted away, state 
legislatures should provide courts with a general framework to determine whether to enforce 
contractual provisions that impose obligations on the surrogate. But before discussing the 
appropriate framework, it is important to see which autonomous rights states allow surrogacy 
agreements to control.  
B. State Statutes Allowing Intrusive Decision-Making Provisions in Surrogacy 
Arrangements 
 Some states have adopted statutes that specifically define which provisions can be 
contained in a surrogacy contract without hindering its enforceability.  Nevada,190 Delaware,191 
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and Illinois192 have enacted legislation that allows a surrogacy agreement to waive certain 
decision-making rights of the surrogate.  For example, Nevada’s surrogacy laws provide that a 
surrogacy agreement will be upheld even it contains the following terms:  
(a) The gestational carrier’s agreement to undergo all medical examinations, 
treatments and fetal monitoring procedures recommended for the success of the 
pregnancy by the physician providing care to the gestational carrier during the 
pregnancy. 
(b) The gestational carrier’s agreement to abstain from any activities that the 
intended parent or parents or the physician providing care to the gestational carrier 
during the pregnancy reasonably believes to be harmful to the pregnancy and the 
future health of any resulting child, including, without limitation, smoking, 
drinking alcohol, using nonprescribed drugs, using prescription drugs not 
authorized by a physician aware of the pregnancy, exposure to radiation or any 
other activity proscribed by a health care provider.193 
Although these provisions would limit the autonomous rights of the surrogate, they appear to be 
reasonable restrictions.194  The potential life engenders some degree of social concern, and as such, 
some of the surrogate’s decision-making rights will need to be subdued by the commercial 
surrogacy agreement between her and the intended parents.  Therefore, it is necessary to find the 
extent to which these provisions can impinge the bodily integrity of the surrogate, striking a 
balance between allowing the intended parents to make intrusive decisions for the surrogate 
mother, and ensuring the surrogacy contract does not divest the surrogate of all autonomous, 
decision-making rights.  
V. Evaluating Possible Solutions to Address Gaps and Variations 
 One of the main concerns pertaining to commercial surrogacy focuses on the belief that the 
intended parents should not have an unfettered ability to control or limit the surrogate’s behavior 
during the pregnancy by provisions in a surrogacy contract.195  Commercial surrogacy 
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arrangements are anomalous in that they involve one or more persons contracting for the provision 
of labor that implicates the bodily integrity of a third party.196  As a result, the surrogate mother is 
unable “to exercise a substantial amount of control over [her] performance of the contract.”197   
Although there is a well-recognized legal doctrine that allows parties to contract freely, 
and as such, waive some of their constitutional rights, the nature of commercial surrogacy is more 
permanent and personal than a typical contract.198  Therefore, legislation should impose 
restrictions on which aspects of decision-making can or cannot be waived.  As noted, in states such 
as Maine, Texas, and Utah, which have adopted broad limitations, these restrictions need to 
provide courts with a particularized framework to determine whether to enforce contractual 
provisions that impose obligations on the surrogate.199  In addition, as exemplified in states such 
as Indiana, Louisiana, and Florida, this framework needs to take into account some degree of social 
concern for the developing infant.200   
 The proposed solution for this matter of contention is to provide a balancing test where 
courts should weigh various factors in order to determine the enforceability of contractual 
provisions that divest the surrogate of her autonomous, decision-making rights.  The first factor 
that courts should take into consideration is the constitutional right of privacy and liberty expressed 
in cases such as Roe v. Wade.201  Due to the permanent and intense nature of surrogacy 
arrangements, a surrogate mother should not be able to waive her constitutional rights—including, 
but not limited to, the right to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy and the right to 
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control her medical treatment.202  As illustrated through case-law, a surrogate mother may change 
her mind or disagree with the intended parents on decisions that she failed to contemplate prior to 
entering into the surrogacy agreement.203  Thus, if a surrogate mother refuses to comport with the 
requests of the intended parents, courts should contemplate the constitutional rights of the 
surrogate as a factor in the balancing test in order to decide whether to enforce the particular 
contractual provision. 
 The second factor looks at the safety concerns presented for the surrogate compared to the 
safety concerns presented for the developing fetus.  For example, contractual provisions imposing 
obligations on the surrogate “to visit the doctor, to eat healthy, and to refrain from consuming 
substances such as drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes that could harm the developing fetus”204 appear 
to be reasonable considering there are potentially higher safety concerns for the baby compared to 
that of the surrogate.  If the safety concerns are comparably close, however, the court should err 
on the side of the surrogate.  This factor takes into account the degree of social concern for the 
developing infant, but continues to place the primacy on the surrogate’s autonomous rights. 
 The third factor urges the courts to examine the degree and nature of the intrusion.  If the 
provision bears ample impingement on the surrogate’s bodily integrity then the court should not 
command its enforcement.  As noted, most commercial surrogacy contracts regulate when the 
surrogate can engage in sexual activity and with whom.205  This level of intrusion on privacy 
interests is justifiable for the first two weeks before and after embryo transfer, however, after this 
extent of time has passed, it would no longer be as compelling of a demand.  This factor provides 
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a safeguard to ensure that intrusion upon the surrogate’s autonomous, decision-making rights is 
minimized.   
   The fourth factor contemplates the burden placed upon the surrogate mother to conform 
to the obligations contained in the surrogacy agreement.  Courts should find fault with provisions 
that are cumbersome for the surrogate to comply with.  The analysis should weigh the minimal 
benefit to the fetus against the burden imposed on the surrogate. For example, terms of the 
agreement stipulating that the surrogate mother must consume a vegan diet and only eat organic 
foods can place an objectionably high burden on the surrogate that should not be enforced.206   
 The last factor that courts should take into consideration is the bargaining power of both 
parties at the time the agreement was made.  To enforce a surrogacy contract, there should be a 
representation of meaningful choice and informed consent on the part of the contracting parties.  
Locking a surrogate into rigid constraints entered into at the formulation of the contract is to ignore 
the social and psychological realities of commercial surrogacy.  Applying contractual provisions 
strictly can conflict with issues of bodily integrity by attempting to confine a surrogate who failed 
to receive proper counseling or full disclosure before entering into the surrogacy agreement.  This 
would be contrary to public policy, and therefore, is an important factor for courts to consider.  
Courts should weigh these factors against one another to determine the appropriate remedy 
if a dispute were to arise between the intended parents and the surrogate over a provision within 
the surrogacy contract.  Courts should recognize that a surrogate mother is placed in a unique 
situation where she is expected to submit to extremely precise, restrictive clauses that control 
nearly every aspect of her personal life without having the ability to stop performance in the middle 
of the contract.207 This balancing test provides a standard that allows courts to weigh the burdens 
                                                          
206 See supra Part III B.  
207 See supra Part III. 
of bodily intrusion against the benefits to the fetus.  Intended parents should not have an unfettered 
ability to control or limit the surrogate’s behavior during the pregnancy by provisions in a 
surrogacy contract. For example, the surrogacy agreement should not be able to force a surrogate 
to have an abortion. The surrogate should retain the ability to do so, however, if it is in her best 
health interest. Ultimately, this framework is designed to protect a surrogate’s bodily autonomy 
and her decision-making rights.   
VI. Conclusion 
In conclusion, states need to regulate surrogacy issues in order to protect a surrogate’s 
bodily autonomy during her pregnancy.  It is important that the autonomous rights of the surrogate 
is “reaffirmed so as to prevent intended parents from believing that by virtue of carrying a fetus 
for them, a surrogate is surrendering all of her constitutional rights to make decisions about her 
own body.”208  An important starting position that states need to consider in determining their 
surrogacy laws is to focus on the surrogate.  Legislation should impose ample restrictions on 
specific rights that cannot be contracted away, as well as provide courts with a legal framework to 
determine the limitations of provisions that divest the surrogate of her autonomous, decision-
making rights.   
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